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Chapter 10. National Security
Battling horsemanfrom a nineteenth-century wall painting, Gujarat
THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES have undergone a substantial
metamorphosis since the emergence of India and Pakistan
from the British Indian Empire in 1947. India's first prime min-
ister, Jawaharlal Nehru (1947-64), had deliberately limited the
expansion and modernization of the armed forces. The ratio-
nale was twofold: Nehru was acutely concerned about the
accelerating costs of defense spending, and he feared that an
excessive emphasis on the armed forces would lead to the mili-
tarization of society and undermine the nation's fledgling dem-
ocratic institutions. The disastrous performance of the Indian
army during the 1962 border war with China, however, led to a
reappraisal of defense strategy and spending. Nehru's legacy
eroded rapidly as increasing emphasis was placed on defense
needs. The success of the Indian military against Pakistan dur-
ing their 1971 war contributed to restoring the morale and
standing in society of the armed forces. During the rest of the
1970s and in the 1980s, India bolstered its regional preemi-
nence with wide-ranging arms transfers from the Soviet Union.
In the late 1980s, in an effort to reduce its dependence on
Soviet weaponry, India began to diversify its arms sources. It
purchased aircraft, submarines, and long-range artillery pieces
from France, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger-
many), Sweden, and Britain. Simultaneously, it continued its
efforts to expand and strengthen domestic capabilities to man-
ufacture a range of weaponry to maximize self-reliance. The
results of these purchases and self-reliance efforts have been
mixed.
The 1980s saw not only substantial growth in Indian defense
expenditures but also the use of the armed forces in support of
larger foreign and security policy goals. Specifically, the army
saw action against Pakistani military personnel in disputed
areas along the Siachen Glacier in Jammu and Kashmir,
deployed at considerable cost as diplomatic efforts failed. All
three branches of the armed forces, but particularly the army,
were used to pursue India's security and foreign policy objec-
tives in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s (see South Asia, ch. 9). More
than 60,000 soldiers were deployed in Sri Lanka as part of the
Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to enforce the terms of the
1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. Designed to serve as a neutral
force between contending ethnic forces, the IPKF became
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enmeshed in operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE). In 1989 the new Sri Lankan president, Rana-
singhe Premadasa, ended a five-and-a-half-year state of emer-
gency and asked India to withdraw the IPKF. Accordingly,
Indian army units returned home with most goals unmet.
In 1988 a smaller, much shorter-lived Indian expedition suc-
cessfully ended a military coup attempt in Maldives and dem-
onstrated the military's effective use of airborne and naval
forces in a joint operation.
India is the preeminent military power in South Asia, but its
margin of superiority over Pakistan—its principal South Asian
rival—has eroded because the central government of India is
faced with severe budgetary constraints. In addition, the armed
forces are no longer able to obtain sophisticated weaponry at
highly subsidized prices from Russia, and substantial numbers
of army units are tied down in various internal security duties.
Insurgencies in Assam,Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab have
necessitated the use of the army in "aid-to-the-civil power"
when the local police and central paramilitary forces are
unable to maintain public order. Increasingly frequent out-
breaks of communal violence also have necessitated the use of
the army to restore calm.
The increased reliance on the army for internal security
duties generated concern among senior officers in the early
1990s. Then chief of army staff General Sunith Francis Rod-
rigues repeatedly expressed his misgivings about the inordinate
use of the army to deal with civil problems because such actions
increased the risk of politicizing the armed forces and reduced
their battle readiness. Moreover, the very nature of counterin-
surgent and counterterrorist operations exposed the army to
charges of human rights violations. In 1993, at the insistence of
the army, the government agreed to examine this growing
problem. Discussions focused on improving the recruitment,
training, and organization of the various central paramilitary
forces.
The air force and the navy underwent considerable growth
and modernization during the 1980s, although their plans for
modernization and expansion, like those of the army, were
hobbled by financial constraints. Nevertheless, the navy has
adequate capabilities for coastal defense as well as the protec-
tion of offshore union territories in the Bay of Bengal and the
Arabian Sea. The air force is equipped with modern combat
aircraft and has moderate airlift capabilities.
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Human rights violations in Assam, Jammu and Kashmir,
Punjab, and other parts of the country have largely been attrib-
uted to the paramilitary forces. The army has willingly acknowl-
edged that some lapses have occurred within its own ranks. It
also has court-martialed officers and enlisted personnel
charged with breaches of proper discipline and conduct. How-
ever, the army has refused to divulge any details about the
extent of these problems. The numbers of individuals prose-
cuted, their ranks, and their names remain outside the public
domain. Nevertheless, Amnesty International and Asia Watch
have reported on incidents they have been able to document.
Colonial-Era Developments
Company Armies
The roots of the modern Indian army are traced to the
forces employed by the English (later British) East India Com-
pany, chartered in 1600, and the French East India Company
(Compagnie des Indes Orientales), established in 1664. The
French, headquartered at Pondicherry (Puduchcheri) by the
1670s, were the first to raise Indian companies and use them in
conjunction with European soldiers. Subsequently, in the
1740s, the British started to organize and train Indian units.
British units were divided into three armies corresponding to
the company's centers of Bengal (headquartered at Fort Will-
iam in Calcutta), Bombay (or Mumbai in the Marathi lan-
guage), and Madras (headquartered at Fort Saint George). In
1748 the East India Company armies were brought under the
command of Stringer Lawrence, who is regarded by historians
as the progenitor of the modern Indian army. Under his guid-
ance, British officers recruited, trained, and deployed these
forces. Although formally under a unified command, the three
armies in practice exercised considerable autonomy because of
the great distances that separated them.
Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the vast majority
of the soldiers of each army was composed of Indian troops
known as sepoys (from the Hindi sipahi, meaning police offi-
cer, or, later, soldier). Sepoy units had Indian junior commis-
sioned officers who could exercise only low-level command.
British officers held all senior positions. No Indian had any
authority over non-Indians. In addition to these all-Indian
units, the British deployed some units of the British Army.
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The Indian Military under the British Raj
Post-Sepoy Rebellion Reorganization
Shortly after the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-58, the role of the
presidency armies was reevaluated (see The British Raj, 1858-
1947, ch. 1). In 1861 the Bengal Army was disbanded, and the
total number of sepoys was reduced from 230,000 to 150,000
while the British element was increased from 40,000 to 75,000.
Most Indian artillery units were disbanded, and artillery was
placed under British control. Under the aegis of the imperial
"divide and rule" policy, which had its inception at this time,
the British ensured that a sense of nationality would not be
allowed to develop among the sepoys. The growth of such feel-
ings, it was feared, would undermine the prospects of imperial
control. Accordingly, Indian regiments increasingly were orga-
nized on a territorial basis; individual companies—and in some
cases entire regiments—were drawn from the same religious,
tribal, or caste backgrounds. When companies from several
regiments were grouped into battalions, considerable efforts
were made to promote cultural and social distinctions among
companies of different compositions.
"Martial Races" Theory
By the end of the nineteenth century, recruitment was con-
fined to certain social classes and communities—principally
those in the northern border areas and Punjab. The narrowing
recruitment base was a response to the Sepoy Rebellion and
reflected the needs of prevailing security requirements. The
bulk of the rebels in the Bengal Army came from the Indo-
Gangetic Plain while those that had remained loyal were mostly
from Punjab.
The experience of the mutiny also gave rise to a pseudo-eth-
nological construction, the concept of "martial races" in South
Asia. The popularization of this notion was widely attributed to
Frederick Sleigh Roberts, Earl of Kandahar, Pretoria, and
Waterford; Roberts was an Indian-born veteran of the British
forces that put down the Sepoy Rebellion and the commander
in chief of the British Indian Army from 1885 to 1893. Roberts
believed that the most martial races were located in northwest-
ern India. He regarded Bengalis, Marathas, and southern eth-
nic groups as lacking in martial virtues. Their warlike
propensities, he contended, had dissipated because of the ease
of living and the hot, enervating climate of these regions.
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Roberts's views profoundly influenced the composition of
the British Indian army in the last decades of the nineteenth
century. For example, when the Bengal Army was reestablished
in 1885, its new units were drawn from Punjab. In 1892 army
policy was changed significantly. Units were no longer raised
on a territorial basis but along what was referred to as "class"
lines. In effect, regiments admitted only those having similar
ethnic, religious, or caste backgrounds. Between 1892 and
1914, recruitment was confined almost entirely to the martial
races. These modes of recruitment and organization created a
professional force profoundly shaped by caste and regional fac-
tors and loyal and responsive to British command. The proce-
dures also perpetuated regional and communal ties and
produced an army that was not nationally based.
Administrative Reform and World War I
Administrative reforms in 1895 abolished the presidency
armies, and command was centralized under the aegis of a sin-
gle army headquarters at Delhi. In the early twentieth century,
the process of centralization continued; and during this
period, the separation between military and civilian spheres of
influence and the ultimate primacy of civilian authority gained
final acceptance in both civilian and military circles.
During World War I, India's contribution of troops, money,
and supplies to the Allied cause was substantial. More than 1
million Indian soldiers were sent abroad, and more than
100,000 were either killed or wounded.
The mobilization for the war effort revealed a number of
shortcomings in the military establishment. Officer casualties
had a particularly pernicious effect on military formations
because only the British officers assigned to a battalion had the
authority and standing to exercise overall command. In addi-
tion, Indian officers from one company could rarely be trans-
ferred to another having a different ethnic, religious, or caste
makeup. As a consequence, after the war most battalions were
reorganized to ease reinforcement among component compa-
nies. Strong pressure from the Indian public also drove the
British to begin training a small complement of Indians for
commissions as a first step in the Indianization of the officer
corps. The Royal Indian Air Force was established in 1932, and
a small Indian marine unit was reorganized into the Royal
Indian Navy in 1934. Indian artillery batteries were first formed
only in 1936. Although the practice of limiting recruitment to
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the martial races had proved inadequate during World War I
and entry had been opened to "nonmartial" groups, the tradi-
tional recruitment emphasis on martial races was nonetheless
resumed after demobilization.
World WarU
The political situation in India underwent a fundamental
transformation at the time of Britain's entry into World War II
(see Political Impasse and Independence, ch. 1). The viceroy
and governor general of India, Victor Alexander John Hope,
Marquis of Linlithgow, without consulting Indian political lead-
ers, declared India to be at war with Germany on September 3,
1939. The legislature sustained the viceregal decree and passed
the Defence of India Bill without opposition, as the representa-
tives of the Indian National Congress (the Congress—see Glos-
sary) boycotted the session. Between 1939 and mid-1945, the
British Indian Army expanded from about 175,000 to more
than 2 million troops—entirely through voluntary enlistment.
The incipient naval and air forces were also expanded, and the
Indian officer corps grew from 600 to more than 14,000.
Indian troops were deployed under overall British command in
Africa, Italy, the Middle East, and particularly in Burma and
Southeast Asia. The great expansion in strength, the overseas
service of Indian forces, and the demonstrated soldierly ability
of Indians from all groups did much to dispel the martial races
theory.
In Asia the Japanese sought to exploit Indian nationalism
and anti-British sentiment by forming and supporting the
Indian National Army (INA—Azad Hind Fauj), which was com-
posed primarily of 25,000 of the 60,000 Indian troops who had
surrendered to the Japanese in Singapore in February 1942.
The army was led by Subhas Chandra Bose, a former militant
president of the Congress, who also appointed himself head of
the Provisional Government of Azad India (Free India). An
unusual feature of the INA was an all-woman, intercaste regi-
ment composed of some 1,500 Indian women from Burma,
Malaya, and Singapore. Both the women and the 25,000-strong
male contingent were organized to fight alongside the Japa-
nese in Burma, but they actually saw little action. Only 8,000
were sent to the front. Japanese and INA troops invaded
Manipur in March 1944 and fought and were defeated in bat-
tles at Imphal and Kohima (see fig. 1). By May 1945, the INA
had disintegrated because of acute logistical problems, defec-
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tions, and superior British-led forces. It is widely held that Bose
was killed in an air crash in Taiwan as he fled at the end of the
war. The British court martialed three INA officers. Nationalist-
minded lawyers, including Nehru, defended them as national
heroes, and the British, feeling intense public pressure, found
them guilty but cashiered them without any further punish-
ment. However, after independence Nehru refused to reinstate
them into the Indian armed forces, fearing that they might sow
discord among the ranks.
Postindependence Developments
The National Forces
Following independence in 1947, important organizational
changes strengthened civilian control over the military. The
position of commander in chiefwas abolished in 1955, and the
three service chiefs were placed on an equal footing beneath
the civilian Ministry of Defence. These changes significantly
reduced the influence of the numerically superior army, to
which the other services had been subordinate, and limited the
service chiefs to advisory roles in the defense decision-making
process. The changes reflected the ambiguous feelings of the
civilian leadership toward the military. Nehru and other Indian
nationalists saw the military as an institution strongly wedded
to the colonial past. The heritage of nonviolence (ahimsa) of
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi also was important to the
national political leadership (see Mahatma Gandhi, ch. 1).
Independence and the partition from Pakistan imposed sig-
nificant costs on the Indian defense establishment that took
years to redress. The partition of the country had entailed the
division of the armed forces personnel and equipment. Pre-
dominantly Muslim units went to Pakistan, followed later by
individual transfers. Close to two-thirds of all army personnel
went to India. As a secular state, India accepted all armed
forces personnel without regard to religious affiliation. The
division of the navy was based on an estimation of each nation's
maritime needs. A combination of religious affiliation and mil-
itary need was applied to the small air force. As a result of parti-
tion, India also received about two-thirds of the materiel and
stores. This aspect of the division of assets was complicated by
the fact that all sixteen ordnance factories were located in
India. India was allowed to retain them with the proviso that it
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would make a lump sum payment to Pakistan to enable it to
develop its own defense production infrastructure.
Independence also resulted in a dramatic reduction of the
number of experienced senior personnel available. In 1947
only six Indians had held brigade-level commands, and only
one had commanded a division. British officers, out of neces-
sity, were retained for varying periods of time after indepen-
dence. British chiefs stayed on the longest in the navy and the
air force. The navy had a British service chief until 1962 and
the air force until 1954. The armed forces also integrated qual-
ified members of the armies of the former princely states that
acceded to India (see National Integration, ch. 1). The term
sepoy, made popular during the colonial era, was dropped
about this time, and the word jawan (Hindi for able-bodied
man) has been used ever since when referring to the Indian
soldier.
The Experience of Wars
Pakistan
The first test for the Indian armed forces came shortly after
independence with the first Indo-Pakistani conflict (1947-48).
The military was called upon to defend the borders of the state
ofJammu and Kashmir when tribals—principally Pathans
—
attacked from the northwest reaches of Kashmir on October
22, 1947. India's 161st Infantry Brigade was deployed and
thwarted the advance of the tribal forces. In early November
1947, the 161st counterattacked and successfully broke
through the enemy defenses. Despite early successes, the
Indian army suffered a setback in December because of logisti-
cal problems. The problems enabled the forces of Azad Kash-
mir (Free Kashmir, as the part of Kashmir under Pakistani
control is called) to take the initiative and force the Indian
troops to retreat from the border areas. In the spring of 1948,
the Indian side mounted another offensive to retake some of
the ground that it had lost. No doubt fearing that the war
might move into Pakistan proper, regular units of the Pakistani
army became more actively involved. As the conflict escalated,
the Indian leadership was quick to recognize that the war could
not be brought to a close unless Pakistani support for the Azad
Kashmir forces could be stopped. Accordingly, on the advice of
Governor General Earl Louis Mountbatten (Britain's last vice-
roy in India in 1947 and governor general of India, 1947-48),
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the Indian government sought United Nations (UN) media-
tion of the conflict on December 31, 1947. There was some
opposition to this move within the cabinet by those who did
not agree with referring the Kashmir dispute to the UN. The
UN mediation process brought the war to a close on January 1,
1949. In all, 1,500 soldiers died on each side during the war.
The second Indo-Pakistani conflict (1965) was also fought
over Kashmir and started without a formal declaration of war.
It is widely accepted that the war began with the infiltration of
Pakistani-controlled guerrillas into Indian Kashmir on about
August 5, 1965. Skirmishes with Indian forces started as early as
August 6 or 7, and the first major engagement between the reg-
ular armed forces of the two sides took place on August 14.
The next day, Indian forces scored a major victory after a pro-
longed artillery barrage and captured three important moun-
tain positions in the northern sector. Later in the month, the
Pakistanis counterattacked, moving concentrations near Tith-
wal, Uri, and Punch. Their move, in turn, provoked a powerful
Indian thrust into Azad Kashmir. Other Indian forces captured
a number of strategic mountain positions and eventually took
the key Haji Pir Pass, eight kilometers inside Pakistani territory.
The Indian gains led to a major Pakistani counterattack on
September 1 in the southern sector, in Punjab, where Indian
forces were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. The
sheer strength of the Pakistani thrust, which was spearheaded
by seventy tanks and two infantry brigades, led Indian com-
manders to call in air support. Pakistan retaliated on Septem-
ber 2 with its own air strikes in both Kashmir and Punjab. The
war was at the point of stalemate when the UN Security Council
unanimously passed a resolution on September 20 that called
for a cease-fire. New Delhi accepted the cease-fire resolution
on September 21 and Islamabad on September 22, and the war
ended on September 23. The Indian side lost 3,000 while the
Pakistani side suffered 3,800 battlefield deaths. The Soviet-bro-
kered Tashkent Declaration was signed on January 10, 1966. It
required that both sides withdraw by February 26, 1966, to
positions held prior to August 5, 1965, and observe the cease-
fire line agreed to onJune 30, 1965.
The origins of the third Indo-Pakistani conflict (1971) were
different from the previous conflicts. The Pakistani failure to
accommodate demands for autonomy in East Pakistan in 1970
led to secessionist demands in 1971 (see The Rise of Indira
Gandhi, ch. 1). In March 1971, Pakistan's armed forces
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launched a fierce campaign to suppress the resistance move-
ment that had emerged but encountered unexpected mass
defections among East Pakistani soldiers and police. The Paki-
stani forces regrouped and reasserted their authority over most
of East Pakistan by May.
As a result of these military actions, thousands of East Paki-
stanis died at the hands of the Pakistani army. Resistance fight-
ers and nearly 10 million refugees fled to sanctuary in West
Bengal, the adjacent Indian state. By midsummer, the Indian
leadership, in the absence of a political solution to the East
Pakistan crisis, had fashioned a strategy designed to assist the
establishment of the independent nation of Bangladesh. As
part of this strategy, in August 1971, India signed a twenty-year
Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the Soviet
Union. One of the treaty's clauses implied that each nation was
expected to come to the assistance of the other in the event of
a threat to national security such as that occurring in the 1965
war with Pakistan. Simultaneously, India organized, trained,
and provided sanctuary to the Mukti Bahini (meaning Libera-
tion Force in Bengali), the East Pakistani armed resistance
fighters.
Unable to deter India's activities in the eastern sector, on
December 3, 1971, Pakistan launched an air attack in the west-
ern sector on a number of Indian airfields, including Ambala
in Haryana, Amritsar in Punjab, and Udhampur inJammu and
Kashmir. The attacks did not succeed in inflicting substantial
damage. The Indian air force retaliated the next day and
quickly achieved air superiority. On the ground, the strategy in
the eastern sector marked a significant departure from previ-
ous Indian battle plans and tactics, which had emphasized set-
piece battles and slow advances. The strategy adopted was a
swift, three-pronged assault of nine infantry divisions with
attached armored units and close air support that rapidly con-
verged on Dhaka, the capital of East Pakistan. Lieutenant
General Sagat Singh, who commanded the eighth, twenty-
third, and fifty-seventh divisions, led the Indian thrust into East
Pakistan. As these forces attacked Pakistani formations, the
Indian air force rapidly destroyed the small air contingent in
East Pakistan and put the Dhaka airfield out of commission. In
the meantime, the Indian navy effectively blockaded East Paki-
stan. Dhaka fell to combined Indian and Mukti Bahini forces
on December 16, bringing a quick end to the war.
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Indian infantry during the
1962 border war with China
Courtesy U.S. News and World
Report Collection, Library of
Congress
Action in the western sector was divided into four segments,
from the cease-fire line inJammu and Kashmir to the marshes
of the Rann of Kutch in northwestern Gujarat. On the evening
of December 3, the Pakistani army launched ground opera-
tions in Kashmir and Punjab. It also started an armored opera-
tion in Rajasthan. In Kashmir, the operations were
concentrated on two key points, Punch and Chhamb. The
Chhamb area witnessed a particularly intense battle where the
Pakistanis forced the Indians to withdraw from their positions.
In other parts of Kashmir, the Indians made some small gains
along the cease-fire line. The major Indian counteroffensive
came in the Sialkot-Shakargarh area south and west of
Chhamb. There, two Pakistani tank regiments, equipped with
United States-made Patton tanks, confronted the Indian First
Armored Corps, which had British Centurion tanks. In what
proved to be the largest tank battle of the war, both sides suf-
fered considerable casualties.
Though the Indian conduct of the land war on the western
front was somewhat timid, the role of the Indian air force was
both extensive and daring. During the fourteen-day war, the air
force's Western Command conducted some 4,000 sorties.
There was little retaliation by Pakistan's air force, partly
because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel.
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Additionally, this lack of retaliation reflected the deliberate
decision of the Pakistan Air Force headquarters to conserve its
forces because of heavy losses incurred in the early days of the
war.
China
The Chinese have two major claims on what India deems its
own territory. One claim, in the western sector, is on Aksai
Chin in the northeastern section of Ladakh District injammu
and Kashmir. The other claim is in the eastern sector over a
region included in the British-designated North-East Frontier
Agency, the disputed part of which India renamed Arunachal
Pradesh and made a state. In the fight over these areas, the
well-trained and well-armed troops of the Chinese People's Lib-
eration Army overpowered the ill-equipped Indian troops, who
had not been properly acclimatized to fighting at high alti-
tudes.
Unable to reach political accommodation on disputed terri-
tory along the 3,225-kilometer-long Himalayan border, the Chi-
nese attacked India on October 20, 1962. At the time, nine
divisions from the eastern and western commands were
deployed along the Himalayan border with China. None of
these divisions was up to its full troop strength, and all were
short of artillery, tanks, equipment, and even adequate articles
of clothing.
In Ladakh the Chinese attacked south of the Karakoram Pass
at the northwest end of the Aksai Chin Plateau and in the
Pangong Lake area about 160 kilometers to the southeast. The
defending Indian forces were easily ejected from their posts in
the area of the Karakoram Pass and from most posts near
Pangong Lake. However, they put up spirited resistance at the
key posts of Daulat Beg Oldi (near the entrance to the pass)
and Chushul (located immediately south of Pangong Lake and
at the head of the vital supply road to Leh, a major town and
location of an air force base in Ladakh). Other Chinese forces
attacked near Demchok (about 160 kilometers southeast of
Chusul) and rapidly overran the Demchok and the Jara La
posts.
In the eastern sector, in Assam, the Chinese forces advanced
easily despite Indian efforts at resistance. On the first day of the
fighting, Indian forces stationed at the Tsang Le post on the
northern side of the Namka Chu, the Khinzemane post, and
near Dhola were overrun. On the western side of the North-
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East Frontier Agency, Tsang Dar fell on October 22, Bum La on
October 23, and Tawang, the headquarters of the Seventh
Infantry Brigade, on October 24. The Chinese made an offer
to negotiate on October 24. The Indian government promptly
rejected this offer.
With a lull in the fighting, the Indian military desperately
sought to regroup its forces. Specifically, the army attempted to
strengthen its defensive positions in the North-East Frontier
Agency and Ladakh and to prepare against possible Chinese
attacks through Sikkim and Bhutan. Army units were moved
from Calcutta, Bihar, Nagaland, and Punjab to guard the
northern frontiers of West Bengal and Assam. Three brigades
were hastily positioned in the western part of the North-East
Frontier Agency, and two other brigades were moved into Sik-
kim and near the West Bengal border with Bhutan to face the
Chinese. Light Stuart tanks were drawn from the Eastern Com-
mand headquarters at Calcutta to bolster these deployments.
In the western sector, a divisional organization was estab-
lished in Leh; several battalions of infantry, a battery of twenty-
five-pounder guns, and two troops ofAMX light tanks were air-
lifted into the Chushul area from Punjab. On November 4, the
Indian military decided that the post at Daulat Beg Oldi was
untenable, and its defenders were withdrawn over the 5,300-
meter-high Sasar Brangsa Pass to a more defensible position.
The reinforcements and redeployments in Ladakh proved
sufficient to defend the Chushul perimeter despite repeated
Chinese attacks. However, the more remote posts at Rezang La
and Gurung Hill and the four posts at Spanggur Lake area fell
to the Chinese.
In the North-East Frontier Agency, the situation proved to be
quite different. Indian forces counterattacked on November 13
and captured a hill northwest of the town of Walong. Con-
certed Chinese attacks dislodged them from this hard-won
position, and the nearby garrison had to retreat down the
Lohit Valley.
In another important section of the eastern sector, the
Kameng Frontier Division, six Chinese brigades attacked across
the Tawang Chu near Jang and advanced some sixteen kilome-
ters to the southeast to attack Indian positions at Nurang, near
Se La, on November 17. Despite the Indian attempt to regroup
their forces at Se La, the Chinese continued their onslaught,
wiping out virtually all Indian resistance in Kameng. By Novem-
ber 18, the Chinese had penetrated close to the outskirts of
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Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometers
from the Assam-North-East Frontier Agency border.
The Chinese did not advance farther and on November 21
declared a unilateral cease-fire. They had accomplished all of
their territorial objectives, and any attempt to press farther into
the plains of Assam would have stretched their logistical capa-
bilities and their lines of communication to a breaking point.
By the time the fighting stopped, each side had lost 500 troops.
The fighting war was over, but a new diplomatic war had
begun. After more than thirty years of border tension and stale-
mate, high-level bilateral talks were held in New Delhi starting
in February 1994 to foster "confidence-building measures"
between the defense forces of India and China, and a new
period of better relations began (see China, ch. 9).
Peacekeeping Operations
In addition to the experience gained in wars with Pakistan
and China, the Indian army has been involved in two regional
peacekeeping operations. The first was in Sri Lanka from 1987
to 1990, the second in Maldives in 1988. In addition, Indian
forces have participated in ten UN peacekeeping forces.
Sri Lanka
Since the early 1970s, ethnic conflict has pitted Sri Lanka's
Tamil minority against the Sinhalese majority over issues of
power sharing and local autonomy. The main combatants are
the Sri Lankan army and the secessionist Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam. Indian involvement, encouraged by pro-Tamil
sentiments in its state of Tamil Nadu, which is close to Sri
Lanka, and the Indian government's covert aid to and training
of Tamil militants between 1977 and 1987, drew India into the
conflict. The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, signed on July 29, 1987,
committed New Delhi to deploying a peacekeeping force on
the island, making the Indian government the principal guar-
antor of a solution to the ethnic violence that had heightened
dramatically since 1983. Nearly 60,000 Indian troops drawn
from two divisions (one from the Central Command and the
other from the Southern Command) were in Sri Lanka as the
Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) between 1987 and 1990.
Originally sent to Sri Lanka as a neutral body with a mission
to ensure compliance with the accord, the IPKF increasingly
became a partisan force fighting against Tamils. The popularity
of Indian forces, which was never high, decreased still further
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amidst charges of rape and murder of civilians. Despite the
considerable experience that Indian troops had gained in
fighting insurgencies in India's northeast, the IPKF was at a
marked disadvantage in Sri Lanka. In fighting Naga and Mizo
guerrillas in northeast India, the army had fought on home
ground, and the central government could couple the army's
efforts with direct political negotiations. In Sri Lanka, the
Indian forces did not possess an adequate local intelligence
network. Despite the growth of the IPKF to 70,000 strong, the
predominantly urban context of northern Sri Lanka imposed
constraints on the use of force. It also is widely believed that Sri
Lankan forces offered only grudging cooperation. Given the
inability of the IPKF to prevent either Sinhalese or Tamil
extremist actions, it steadily lost the support of both sides in
the conflict.
As the Sri Lankan presidential elections approached in
December 1988, both the contending parties, the ruling
United National Party led by then Prime Minister Ranasinghe
Premadasa, and the three-party United Front led by former
Prime Minister Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike,
expressed their reservations about the 1987 accord. Premadasa
was elected, and after he was inaugurated, he declared an end
to the five-and-a-half-year state of emergency and asked India
to withdraw the IPKF. In July 1989, the IPKF started a phased
withdrawal of its remaining 45,000 troops, a process that took
until March 1990 to complete.
During the three-year involvement, some 1,500 Indian
troops were killed and more than 4,500 were wounded during
this operation. Another casualty resulting from the Sri Lanka
mission was the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi by a Tamil militant in 1991. As a participant in what
began as a peacekeeping mission, the Indian armed forces
learned some valuable lessons. These included the realization
that better coordination is needed between military and politi-
cal decision makers for such missions. One of the commanders
of the IPKF also noted that training, equipment, and command
and control needed improvement.
In 1995, at the request of the Sri Lankan government,
Indian naval ships and air force surveillance aircraft estab-
lished a quarantine zone around the LTTE stronghold in the
Jaffna area. The supply of military materiel by Indian sympa-
thizers to the Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka from Tamil Nadu,
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just thirty-five kilometers across the Palk Strait, was an ongoing
problem that continued to keep India involved in the conflict.
Maldives
In 1988, the Indian Army experienced a small success in
squashing an attempted coup in Maldives, 600 kilometers
south of India in the Indian Ocean. Maldivian minister of for-
eign affairs Fathullah Jameel had called Rajiv Gandhi (India's
prime minister from 1984 to 1989) at 5:30 a.m. on November
3, 1988 to request India's assistance. By 9:00 a.m. the same
morning, India's Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs had
been convened. At noon the same day, the committee gave its
approval for military support to the regime of President Mau-
moon Abdul Gayoom. Later in the day, the first Indian troops
were airlifted from a military base at Agra, Uttar Pradesh. Some
1,600 Indian troops were dispatched within hours. During the
next three days, the mercenaries involved in the attempted
coup were rounded up by Indian troops who had parachuted
in. The Indian navy also effectively blocked maritime escape
routes the coup leaders might have taken. The operation was
completed by November 6.
Three important inferences can be made from this success-
ful attempt at force projection. First, it demonstrated that suffi-
cient interservice cooperation existed to allow the armed
forces to respond rapidly to political directives. Second, it
showed the capability of the armed forces to airlift troops
regionally at short notice. And third, it demonstrated the will-
ingness of the Indian political leadership to use its military
strength in the region to support a friendly regime.
United Nations Peacekeeping Forces
Indian armed forces personnel have been involved in a vari-
ety of UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions and military
observer operations, giving them invaluable experience in
interacting with the armed forces of other nations. In addition,
although it was not a peacekeeping force per se, an Indian air-
borne field ambulance unit participated in the Korean War
(1950-53).
Indian infantry, supply, transportation, and signal units
served between 1956 and 1967 with the First United Nations
Emergency Force in the Suez Canal, Sinai Peninsula, and Gaza.
From 1960 to 1964, Indian infantry, aircraft, and medical per-
sonnel, and air dispatch, signal, supply, and postal units served
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in the Congo (as Zaire was then named). Indian military
observers participated in UN observation groups in Lebanon
in 1958; Yemen in 1963-64 (where India supplied one of the
chiefs of staff); West Irian (which later became Indonesia's
Irian Barat Province) in 1962-63; the Iran-Iraq border in 1988-
91; Angola in 1989-91; and Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua in 1989-92. Military observers,
police monitors, and election supervisors were sent to Namibia
in 1989 and 1990 to help oversee elections.
In the 1990s, more military observers were sent abroad.
There was a second observers' mission to Angola (1991-92) as
well as missions to El Salvador (starting in 1991), former Yugo-
slavia (starting in 1992), and Mozambique (starting in 1992).
The last was a force of more than 900 administrative, engineer-
ing, and logistic personnel. A sappers' contingent charged with
clearing landmines and related construction projects partici-
pated in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambo-
dia in 1992-93. An infantry brigade—including army
physicians, nurses, veterinarians, a tank sqaudron, a mecha-
nized battalion, a 120-millimeter mortar battery, an engineer
company, and two flights of helicopters—and an air force heli-
copter detachment, a force totalling nearly 5,000 personnel,
were sent to Somalia in 1993-94 to participate in peacekeeping
and humanitarian relief efforts.
In an effort to achieve some joint operational understanding
with other nations' forces, India has also cooperated in various
peacetime joint exercises with Indian Ocean nations and with
the United States. In 1992, India and the United States con-
ducted joint naval exercises in the Arabian Sea near Kochi
(Cochin), and in 1994 Indian marine commandos and United
States Marines conducted joint exercises with little fanfare.
National Security Structure
Civil-Military Relations
The pattern of civil-military relations prevailing in India was
created by the staff of Lord Mountbatten as a three-tier system
extending from the prime minister to the three service chiefs.
At the apex of this structure is the Political Affairs Committee
of the Cabinet. The second level is the Defence Minister's Com-
mittee of the Cabinet, and the third level is the Chiefs of Staff
Committee. Other committees, such as the Joint Intelligence
Committee, the Defence Science Advisory Committee, and the
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Joint Planning Committee, assist the higher committees. There
were proposals in the mid-1990s to establish a joint defense
staff for better integration of interservice resources, programs,
policies, and operations (see fig. 16).
In the immediate postindependence period, the Defence
Minister's Committee of the Cabinet did not play an active role
in policy formulation. The higher organization of defense was
vested largely with the minister of defence. From 1957 to 1962,
this position was held by V.K. Krishna Menon, whose authority
far exceeded that usually accorded a minister of defence. A
confidante of Nehru's through much of the late preindepen-
dence period, Menon functioned as Nehru's alter ego for
national security and defense planning. Consequently, the
locus of decision making shifted from the cabinet to the
Defence Minister's Committee. Menon was in many ways
responsible for laying the foundations of India's military-indus-
trial base.
Among other endeavors, Menon was responsible for the
development of ordnance facilities to manufacture the
Ichapore semiautomatic rifle; a tank manufacturing complex
at Avadi. Tamil Nadu: facilities to build frigates at the Mazagon
Dock naval shipyard in Bombay; and the licensed manufacture
of Soviet-designed MiG—23 fighter aircraft in Nasik. Maharash-
tra. However, his highly idiosyncratic manners, his high-
handed ways, and his involvement in the tactical aspects of mil-
itary decision making had negative consequences. For exam-
ple, he quarrelled with the professional military, particularly
India's third chief of armv staff, General K.S. Thimayya, over
Thimayya's attempt to warn Menon and Nehru about the
emerging Chinese threat as early as 1959. When Thimayya
resigned in protest, Nehru prevailed upon him to withdraw his
resignation. Unfortunately, when questioned in the Lok Sabha
(House of the People) , the lower house of the Parliament,
about Thimawa's resignation, Nehru offered a rather weak
defense of the general's actions and sought to deflect the criti-
cisms of his minister of defence (see The Legislature, ch. 8).
When Thimayya retired as chief of army staff in May 1961,
Menon passed over Thimawa's designated successor, Lieuten-
ant General S.P.P. Thorat, and instead appointed a junior offi-
cer, Lieutenant General P.N. Thapar. The appointment not
only created a rift between the professional military and politi-
cal leadership but also alienated a number of high-ranking offi-
cials in the Ministry of Defence. Menon's actions also
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demoralized competent personnel in the Chilian and military
bureaucracies, which led to important gaps in defense pre-
paredness and planning. Menon's dominance of the defense
planning process significantly contributed to the military deba-
cle of 1962.
The Indian defeat led to the establishment of a new Emer-
gency Committee of the Cabinet. This committee introduced a
system of "morning meetings" with the minister of defence and
the three service chiefs. The morning meetings, which are con-
ducted without a predetermined agenda, deal with current
defense issues on a regular basis. The meetings are also
attended by the cabinet secretary, the defence secretary, and
the scientific adviser to the minister of defence. These morning
meetings continue to take place.
In the Chiefs of Staff Committee, formal equality prevails
among the three service chiefs despite the fact that the army
remains the largest of the three branches of the armed ser-
vices. This formal equality among the three services came
about with independence.
To facilitate defense planning, the government established
two organizations: the Defence Coordination and Implementa-
tion Committee and the Defence Planning Staff. The Defense
Coordination and Implementation Committee is chaired by
the defence secretary and meets on an ad hoc basis. Its mem-
bership includes the three service chiefs, representatives from
civilian and military intelligence organizations, and the secre-
tary of defence production. The Defence Planning Staff, a per-
manent body, was established in 1986. Composed of officers
drawn from all three services, it is responsible for developing
overall national security strategy. It is also charged with briefing
the Chiefs of Staff Committee on long-term threats to national
security.
Defense Spending
Until 1962 defense spending was deliberately limited. In the
wake of the war with China, defense spending rose from 2.1
percent of the gross national product (GXP—see Glossary) in
fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1962 to 4.5 percent in FY 1964. In
FY 1994, defense spending was slightly less than 5 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary). In terms of dol-
lars, FY 1994 total defense services expenditures were projected
at USS7.2 billion (but are likely to have been close to USS7.8
billion). Proportionately, based on figures provided by the gov-
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eminent, 48.4 percent of expenditures were for the army, 15.7
percent for the air force, 5.9 percent for the navy, and 30 per-
cent for capital outlays for defense services and defense ord-
nance factories. The latter provide materiel to the armed
forces through some thirty-nine ordnance factories and eight
public-sector enterprises that build ships, aircraft, and major
defense items. The defense budget for FY 1994 was 6.5 percent
higher than the revised estimate for FY 1993. The allocation
increased to 14.9 percent of the total central government bud-
get, up from 13 percent in the previous two fiscal years.
Nuclear energy and space research are not fully accounted for
in the defense budget, but most paramilitary forces fall within
the purview of the Ministry of Defence.
Organization and Equipment of the Armed Forces
The Army
In 1994 the army had approximately 940,000 men and
women in its ranks and more than 36,000 in reserve forces.
The army is headquartered in New Delhi and is under the
direction of the chief of the army staff, always a full general.
The chief of the army staff is assisted by a vice chief, two deputy
chiefs, a military secretary, and the heads of four main staff
divisions: the adjutant general, the quartermaster general, the
master general of ordnance, and the engineer in chief.
The army has five tactical area commands: the Northern
Command headquartered at Udhampur inJammu and Kash-
mir, the Western Command headquartered at Chandimandir
in Chandigarh, the Central Command headquartered at Luck-
now in Uttar Pradesh, the Eastern Command headquartered at
Calcutta, and the Southern Command headquartered at Pune
in Maharashtra (see fig. 17). Each command is headed by a
lieutenant general. The principal combat formations within
the scope of these commands are armored divisions and inde-
pendent armored brigades, infantry divisions, mountain infan-
try divisions, independent infantry brigades, airborne/
commando brigades, and independent artillery brigades (see
table 34, Appendix). These units are organized in twelve corps-
level formations.
The army is equipped with some 3,400 main battle tanks. Of
these, 1,200 are indigenously manufactured Vijayanta tanks.
Additionally, the army has some T-55, T-72, and PT-76 tanks.
The Arjun main battle tank has been under development by
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the Defence Research and Development Organisation
(DRDO) since 1983, and, in 1995, limited production was
expected to begin in 1996.
To complement indigenous production, however, it was
reported in 1994 that Russia had agreed to help India modern-
ize its T-72 tanks and to sell and lease other types of weapons.
It is generally understood that about 70 percent of India's mili-
tary equipment is of Soviet origin. Some army officials con-
tinue to favor Russian-made equipment, such as the T-72 tank,
over Indian adaptations of the same items, such as the T-72 MI
tank developed by the DRDO.
The army also has substantial artillery forces. The best esti-
mate places the army's towed artillery capabilities at more than
4,000 pieces. In addition to the towed artillery, the army has
self-propelled artillery. Finally, it has substantial numbers of
surface-to-air missile capabilities, the total number being more
than 1,200. In 1986 air observation post units were transferred
from the air force to the army to form the Army Aviation
branch. Using nine helicopter squadrons, Army Aviation has
supported ground units in the Siachen Glacier inJammu and
Kashmir and in Sri Lanka, as well as counterinsurgency opera-
tions in various parts of the country. Army Aviation has also
participated in disaster relief.
Apart from its nine squadrons of helicopters, the army has
eight air observation squadrons and six antitank/transport
squadrons. It relies on the air force for air support, lift capabili-
ties, and air supply (see table 35, Appendix).
An extensive body of schools and centers supports army
operations. The officer corps is largely drawn from the
National Defence Academy at Khadakvasla, Maharashtra, a
joint services training institution that provides educational
equivalents to the bachelor of arts or bachelor of science
degrees to cadets for all three service arms. Cadets spend their
first three years at the National Defence Academy and then are
sent to their respective service academies for further training
before being commissioned in the armed forces. A preparatory
school, the Rashtriya Indian Military College, at Dehra Dun,
Uttar Pradesh, provides education to candidates for the
National Defence Academy. After completing their studies at
the National Defence Academy, army cadets are sent to the
Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun. Other Indian Military
Academy cadets are graduates of the Army Cadet College or
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Figure 17. Area Commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 1995
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Union Public Service Commission Examination. They spend
between twelve and twenty-four months at the Indian Military
Academy before being commissioned in the army as second
lieutenants. Still other officer training occurs at the Officers
1
Training Academy in Madras, Tamil Nadu, where a forty-four-
week session is offered to university graduates seeking a short-
service commission.
In addition to the Indian Military Academy, the army runs a
number of military education establishments. The more prom-
inent ones include the College of Combat at Mhow, Madhya
Pradesh; the High Altitude Warfare School at Gulmarg,Jammu
and Kashmir; and the Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare
School at Vairengte, Mizoram. The army also operates the
Defence Services Staff College at Wellington in the Nilgiri Hills
in Tamil Nadu, which provides master of science-level joint-ser-
vice training for mid-level staff appointments and promotes
interservice cooperation.
In 1994 it was reported that there were 200 women in the
armed forces. In the army, which employs women as physicians
and nurses, the participation of women is small but growing.
The Indian Military Nursing Service was formed in 1926 and
has eight nursing schools (five army, two navy, and one air
force) and one nursing college in Pune. Bachelor of science
graduates are commissioned as lieutenants in the Medical
Nursing Service and attached to the various components of the
armed forces. Ranks as high as colonel can be attained by
career officers. In the mid-1990s, a small but increasing num-
ber of women officers were being assigned to nonmedical ser-
vices. In 1994, there were fifty women nonmedical army
officers and another twenty-five in training. They are university
graduates who have been put through rigorous training and
are reported to be eager for combat unit assignments.
The Navy
The origins of the modern Indian navy are traced to a mari-
time force established by the East India Company in the seven-
teenth century. This force had a variety of names—the Bombay
Marine, the Indian Navy, and the Indian Marine. In 1934 the
Royal Indian Navy was established, with Indians serving prima-
rily in lower-level positions. After independence the navy was
the most neglected of the three services because the national
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The first efforts at naval rearmament emerged in the 1964—
69 Defence Plan, which called for the replacement of India's
aging fleet and the development of a submarine service.
Between 1947 and 1964, fiscal constraints had prevented the
implementation of ambitious plans for naval expansion. Conse-
quently, many of the vessels were obsolete and of little opera-
tional value. As part of this expansion program, the British
helped develop the Mazagon Dock shipyard for the local pro-
duction of British Leander-class frigates. The Soviets, however,
were willing to support all phases of the planned naval expan-
sion. Accordingly, they supplied naval vessels, support systems,
and training on extremely favorable terms. By the mid-1960s,
they had replaced Britain as India's principal naval supplier
(see table 36, Appendix).
During the 1980s, Indian naval power grew significantly.
During this period, the naval facilities at Port Blair in the Anda-
man Islands, in the Nicobar Islands, and in Lakshadweep were
significantly upgraded and modernized. A new line of Leander-
class frigates was manufactured at Mazagon Dock in collabora-
tion with Vickers and Yarrow of Britain. These frigates, redesig-
nated as the Godavari class, have antisubmarine warfare
capabilities and can carry two helicopters. During the 1980s,
plans were also finalized for the licensed manufacture of a line
of West German Type 1500 submarines (known as the Shishu-
mar class in India). In addition to these developments at Maza-
gon Dock, the naval air arm also was upgraded. India
purchased nearly two squadrons of the vertical and short take-
off and landing (VSTOL) Sea Harriers to replace an earlier
generation of Sea Hawks.
In the mid-1990s, India was preparing for a major modern-
ization program that was to include completion of three 5,000-
ton Delhi-class destroyers, the building of three 3,700-ton frig-
ates based on Italian Indian Naval Ship (INS)-IO design, and
the acquisition of four hydrographic survey ships. Also to be
built were an Indian-designed warship called Frigate 2001; six
British Upholder-class submarines; an Indian-designed and
Indian-built missile-firing nuclear submarine—the Advanced
Technology Vessel—based on the Soviet Charlie II class; and an
Indian-designed and Indian-built 17,000-ton air defense ship
capable of carrying between twelve and fifteen aircraft. The air-
defense ship will be, in effect, a replacement for India's two
aging British aircraft carriers, the INS Vikrant, the keel ofwhich
was laid in 1943 but construction of which was not completed
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until 1961 and which was slated for decommissioning by 2000,
and the INS Viraat, which entered service in 1987 and is likely
to be decommissioned by 2005. The problems encountered
with modernizing these and other foreign-source ships led
India to decide against acquiring an ex-Soviet Kiev-class aircraft
carrier in 1994.
In the spirit of international military cooperation, India has
made moves in the early and mid-1990s to enhance joint-
nation interoperability. Indian naval exercises have taken place
with ships from the Russian navy and those of Indian Ocean lit-
toral states and other nations, including the United States.
Naval headquarters is located in New Delhi. It is under the
command of the chief of naval staff—a full admiral. The chief
of naval staff has four principal staff officers: the vice chief of
naval staff, the vice chief of personnel, the chief of material,
and the deputy chief of naval staff. The total strength of the
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navy in 1994 was 54,000, including 5,000 naval aviation person-
nel and 1,000 marines (one regiment, with a second reportedly
forming).
Women were inducted into the navy for the first time in
1992, when twenty-two were trained as education, logistics, and
law cadres. In 1993 additional women were recruited for air
traffic control duties. By 1994 there were thirty-five women
naval officers.
The navy is deployed under three area commands, each
headed by a flag officer. The Western Naval Command is head-
quartered in Bombay on the Arabian Sea; the Southern Naval
Command in Kochi (Cochin), in Kerala, also on the Arabian
Sea; and the Eastern Naval Command in Vishakhapatnam,
Andhra Pradesh, on the Bay of Bengal. Additionally, the navy
has important bases in Calcutta and Goa.
The Southern Naval Command is responsible for naval offi-
cer training, which occurs at the Indian Naval Academy in Goa.
Officer candidates are largely drawn from the National
Defence Academy. After commissioning, officers are offered
specialized training in antisubmarine warfare, aviation, com-
munications, electronic warfare, engineering, hydrography,
maritime warfare, missile warfare, navigation, and other naval
specialties at various naval training institutions, many of which
are collocated with the Training Command headquarters on
Wiilingdon Island, near Kochi.
The Air Force
The air force was established in 1932. In 1994 it had 110,000
personnel and 779 combat aircraft. The air force, which is
headquartered in New Delhi, is headed by the chief of air staff,
an air chief marshal. He is assisted by six principal staff officers:
the vice chief of air staff, the deputy chief of air staff, the air
officer in charge of administration, the air officer in charge of
personnel, the air officer in charge of maintenance, and the
inspector general of flight safety. The air force is deployed into
five operational commands: the Western Air Command, head-
quartered at New Delhi; the Southwestern Air Command,
headquartered at Jodhpur, Rajasthan; the Eastern Air Com-
mand, headquartered at Shillong, Meghalaya; the Central Air
Command, headquartered at Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh; and
the Southern Air Command, headquartered at Thiruvanan-
thapuram (Trivandrum), Kerala. Additionally, there are two
functional commands: the Training Command at Bangalore,
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Karnataka, and the Maintenance Command at Nagpur, Maha-
rashtra.
As of 1994, the air force was equipped with twenty-two squad-
rons of ground attack fighters. Five of these squadrons had a
total of eighty-nine British Jaguar aircraft. Another five squad-
rons had 120 Soviet-origin MiG—27 aircraft. The air force also
fielded twenty fighter squadrons, two of which were equipped
with a total of thirty-five French-built Mirage 2000 H/TH air-
craft. There were also twelve squadrons of transport aircraft in
the inventory (see table 37, Appendix). Because of the large
number of Soviet-origin aircraft, the air force is dependent on
Russia for spare parts and equipment and weapons upgrades.
In March 1995, Russia agreed to upgrade India's MiG—21 air-
craft.
Aside from the Training Command at Bangalore, the center
for primary flight training is located at the Air Force Academy
at Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, followed by operational train-
ing at various air force schools. Advanced training is also con-
ducted at the Defence Services Staff College; specialized
advanced flight training schools are located at Bidar, Karna-
taka, and Hakimpet, Andhra Pradesh (also the location for
helicopter training). Technical schools are found at a number
of other locations.
In 1991 the government approved the induction of women
into nontechnical air force officer billets, such as administra-
tion, logistics, accounting, education, and meteorology. In
1992 opportunities for "pioneer women officers" were opened
in the areas of transportation, helicopters, and navigation, and
the first group of thirteen women cadets entered the Air Force
Academy. During their flight training, they qualified on HPT-
32 and Kiran aircraft to earn their air force commissions. After
completing ten months' training, five of the seven successful
course graduates received further training on various transport
aircraft. By 1994, there were fifty-five women officers in the air
force.
Recruitment and Training
Under the Indian constitution, as amended in 1977, each cit-
izen has a fundamental duty to "defend the country and render
national service when called upon to do so" (see The Constitu-
tional Framework, ch. 8). However, the three services have
always been all-volunteer forces, and general conscription has
never proved necessary. Military service has long been deemed
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an attractive option for many in a society where employment
opportunities are scarce. The technical branches of the armed
forces, however, have experienced problems with recruitment.
Since the 1980s, as a result of the growth and diversification of
India's industrial base, employment opportunities for individu-
als with technical training have expanded substantially. Conse-
quently, fewer trained individuals have sought employment
opportunities in the armed services.
The army and navy maintain a combined recruitment orga-
nization that operates sixty offices in key cities and towns
nationwide. The air force has a separate recruiting organiza-
tion with twelve offices. Army and navy recruitment officers
tour rural districts adjacent to their stations and also draw from
nearby urban areas. The air force and the navy draw a dispro-
portionate number of their recruits from the urban areas,
where educational opportunities are adequate to generate
applicants capable of mastering technical skills. The army also
recruits outside India, admitting ethnic Gurkhas (also seen as
Gorkhas) from Nepal into a Gurkha regiment.
Initial enlistments vary in length, depending on the service
and the branch or skill category, but fifteen years is considered
the minimum. The tour of duty is generally followed by two to
five years of service in a reserve unit. Reenlistment is permitted
for those who are qualified, particularly those possessing neces-
sary skills. The minimum age for enlistment is seventeen years;
the maximum varies between twenty and twenty-seven, depend-
ing on the service and skill category. The compulsory retire-
ment age for officers also varies, ranging from forty-eight for
army majors, navy lieutenant commanders, and air force
squadron leaders and below, to sixty for army generals, navy
admirals, and air force air chief marshals. On occasion a two-
year extension is granted on the grounds of exceptional orga-
nizational needs or personal ability.
Candidates have to meet minimum physical standards,
which differ among the three services and accommodate the
various physical traits of particular ethnic groups. Since 1977
recruiting officers have relaxed physical standards slightly
when evaluating the only sons of serving or former military
personnel—both as a welfare measure and as a means of main-
taining a family tradition of military service.
Educational standards for enlisted ranks differ according to
service and skill category; the army requirement varies from
basic literacy to higher secondary education (see Primary and
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Secondary Education, ch. 2). The other two services require
higher educational levels, reflecting their greater need for
technical expertise. The air force requires at least a higher sec-
ondary education, and the navy insists on graduation from a
secondary school for all except cooks and stewards. Officer
candidates have to complete a higher secondary education and
pass a competitive qualifying exam for entry into precommis-
sion training. All services also accept candidates holding uni-
versity degrees in such fields as engineering, physics, or
medicine for direct entry into the officer corps.
Enlistment was legally opened to all Indians following inde-
pendence in 1947. In 1949 the government abolished recruit-
ment on an ethnic, linguistic, caste, or religious basis.
Exceptions were army infantry regiments raised before World
War II, where cohesion and effectiveness were thought to be
rooted in long-term attachment to traditions. Some army regi-
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ments have a homogeneous composition; other regiments seg-
regate groups only at battalion or company levels. Others are
completely mixed throughout. In general, the army has
steadily evolved into a more heterogeneous service since 1947.
Regiments raised during and after World War II have recruited
Indians of almost all categories, and the doubling of the army's
size after the 1962 border war with China sped up the process.
The armed forces have made a concerted effort to recruit
among underrepresented segments of the population and,
during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, reformed the recruit-
ing process to eliminate some of the subjectivity in the candi-
date selection process. Since 1989 the government has sought
to apportion recruitment from each state and union territory
according to its share of the population. Both the air force and
the navy are now almost completely "mixed" services and dis-
play considerable heterogeneity in their composition.
Conditions of Service
Pay and allowances for armed forces personnel compare
favorably with civilian employment. Monthly salaries vary
according to the service, although personnel usually earn simi-
lar pay for equivalent duties. Additionally, there is an extensive
and complex system of special allowances that depend on con-
ditions and kind of service. Free food for personnel in both
field and garrison areas was extended after 1983 to all person-
nel up to the rank of colonel. All personnel are entitled to
annual leaves of varying lengths, and, other than for a few
exceptions, the services bear transportation costs for personnel
and their families. Commissioned officers and other desig-
nated ranks contribute to the Armed Forces Provident Fund, a
form of life insurance.
Personnel retiring after twenty years of service as an officer
or fifteen years of enlisted service receive pensions based on
the rank held at retirement. Retirees without the minimum ser-
vice requirement receive special one-time bonuses. Additional
remuneration accrues to those disabled in the line of service
or—in the event of the death of active-duty personnel—to their
surviving dependents.
The Soldiers', Sailors', and Airmen's Board, chaired by the
minister of defence, is one of the most important organizations
dealing with the welfare of active-duty personnel and their
dependents. The board works closely with the Directorate of
Resettlement in the Ministry of Defence to assist former service
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personnel and their dependents to find employment on their
return to civilian life. The directorate also operates cooperative
industrial and agricultural estates and training programs to
prepare former service personnel for employment in new
fields. Both central and state-level governments reserve a per-
centage of vacancies in the public sector for former military
personnel.
Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia
Indian military uniforms resemble those in the correspond-
ing British services: olive drab for the army, dark blue for the
navy, and sky blue for the air force. More uniform variations
exist in the army than in the other services, with certain army
regiments preserving traditional accoutrements. Sikhs may
wear turbans instead of standard military headgear, for exam-
ple (see Sikhism, ch. 3).
The rank structure in the three services, especially in the
commissioned officer ranks, for the most part follows conven-
tional British practice. The army, however, has the category of
junior commissioned officer, for which there is no precise
equivalent in the United States or British services. Junior com-
missioned officers are promoted on a point system from within
the enlisted ranks of their regiments, filling most of the junior
command slots, such as platoon leaders. The senior junior
commissioned officer usually acts as the principal assistant to
the commanding officer.
Rank insignia closely follow the British system. Combina-
tions of stars, Lion of Sarnath (the national emblem) badges,
crossed sabers, and crossed batons in a wreath show respective
army ranks from junior commissioned officer up through field
marshal. The latter rank has been granted to only two distin-
guished Indian officers: K.M. Cariappa, a highly decorated vet-
eran of the 1947-48 war with Pakistan, and S. H.F.J. "Sam"
Manekshaw, the strategist of the 1971 war with Pakistan. Arm
chevrons worn with the point down indicate enlisted ranks.
Naval insignia follow the convention of sleeve stripes for offi-
cers and fouled anchor badges for enlisted personnel. The air
force uses broad and narrow sleeve stripe combinations for
officer ranks and combinations of chevrons, Lion of Sarnath
badges, and wing symbols for enlisted ranks (see fig. 18; fig.
19).
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Paramilitary and Reserve Forces
Paramilitary Forces
In addition to the regular armed forces, India also has para-
military forces. These forces have grown dramatically since
independence. There are twelve paramilitary organizations,
which have an authorized strength of around 1.3 million per-
sonnel. In 1994, their reported actual strength was 692,500.
These organizations include the Coast Guard Organisation and
the Defence Security Force, which are subordinate to the Min-
istry of Defence. Paramilitary forces subordinate to the Minis-
try of Home Affairs include the Assam Rifles, the Border
Security Force, the Central Industrial Security Force, the Cen-
tral Reserve Police Force, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, and
the Rashtriya Rifles (National Rifles). The National Security
Guards, a joint antiterrorist contingency force, are charged
with protection of high-level persons (the so-called very very
important persons—WIPs) and are subordinate to the Office
of the Prime Minister (also sometimes known as the Prime
Minister's Secretariat.) The guards are composed of elements
of the armed forces, the Central Reserve Police Force, and the
Border Security Force. The Special Frontier Force also is subor-
dinate to the Office of the Prime Minister. The Railway Protec-
tion Force is subordinate to the Ministry of Railways. At the
local level, there is the Provincial Armed Constabulary, which is
controlled by the governments of the states and territories (see
State and Other Police Services, this ch.).
During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, local police forces could
not deal with the mounting array of sectarian, ethnic, and
regional conflicts, and paramilitary forces were increasingly
called on for assistance. In addition to security and guard
duties, paramilitary organizations assist local and state-level
police forces in maintaining public order and shield the army
from excessive use in "aid-to-the-civil-power" operations. These
operations essentially involve quelling public disorder when
local police forces prove inadequate to the task.
The Coast Guard Organisation was constituted as an Armed
Force of the Union in 1978 under the administrative control of
the Ministry of Defence (although it is funded by the Ministry
of Home Affairs), following its 1977 establishment as a tempo-
rary navy element. Its principal mission is to protect the coun-
try's maritime assets, particularly India's 200-nautical-mile
exclusive economic zone and the marine resources contained
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in the area, which comprises nearly 2.8 million square kilome-
ters. The coast guard is also responsible for the prevention of
poaching and smuggling, the control of marine pollution, and
carrying out search-and-rescue missions. Under the command
of a director general, the coast guard is organized into three
national maritime zones: the Western Maritime Zone, head-
quartered at Bombay; the Eastern Maritime Zone, headquar-
tered at Madras; and the Andaman and Nicobar Maritime
Zone, headquartered at Port Blair. The zones are further subdi-
vided into district headquarters, one each for the eight mari-
time states on the mainland and two in the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands. In times of emergency, the coast guard is
expected to work with the navy. In the late 1980s, coast guard
units from the eastern zone supported Indian peacekeeping
efforts in Sri Lanka. The coast guard's equipment includes
about fifty ships, nine helicopters, and thirteen fixed-wing air-
craft (see table 38, Appendix).
Another Ministry of Defence paramilitary organization has a
security mission. The Defence Security Force guards Ministry
of Defence facilities throughout India.
The Border Security Force was established in the closing
days of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani conflict. Its principal mission
involves guarding the Indo-Pakistani line of actual control in
Jammu and Kashmir as well as borders with Bangladesh and
Burma. It works in internal security and counterinsurgency
operations in Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab. The
border force has also been used to deal with communal rioting.
Another Ministry of Homes Affairs paramilitary force
deployed in Jammu and Kashmir is the Rashtriya Rifles. In
1994 it had 5,000 troops, all of whom served in Jammu and
Kashmir. Some observers expected the force to grow to thirty
battalions, with around 25,000 personnel. In March 1995,
Indian television referred to the Delta Force of the "fledgling"
Rashtriya Rifles. It was reported that the force was operating
against "terrorists" and "foreign mercenaries" in Doda District
in south-centralJammu and Kashmir.
Founded in 1939, the Central Reserve Police Force is the
country's oldest paramilitary organization. It maintains inter-
nal order when local and state-level forces prove inadequate to
the task. The Central Reserve Police Force in Assam, Jammu
and Kashmir, and Punjab has worked in counterinsurgency
operations. This force also was dispatched to Sri Lanka during
India's 1987-90 involvement there. The Ministry of Defence's
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weekly armed forces magazine, Sainik Samachar, reported that
the Mahila Battalion (Women's Battalion) of the Central
Reserve Police Force had "proved its mettle in hot warlike con-
ditions in Sri Lanka," and had established women as "a force to
reckon with" in the paramilitary.
Another significant paramilitary organization is the Indo-
Tibetan Border Police, established in 1962 in the aftermath of
the war with China. It is primarily responsible for the security
of the border with China.
The Special Frontier Force, established in 1962 in the after-
math of the war with China, is less well publicized by the gov-
ernment. Apparently it is an elite, parachute-qualified
commando unit, nominally subordinate to the army and
deployed along sensitive areas of the border with China, and
recruited partially from among border-area hill tribes and
Tibetan refugees. The Special Frontier Force also appears to
have a domestic security role; members of the force were
involved in the Golden Temple siege in 1984. In 1994 its
reported strength was 3,000, making it one of the smallest para-
military forces.
Reserve Forces
India's "second line of defense" is composed of several citi-
zen mass organizations. These include the Territorial Army, a
voluntary, part-time civilian force that receives military training
and serves as a reserve force for the army "to relieve [it] of
static duties, to aid the civil power, and to provide units for the
regular Army, if and when required." It was raised in 1949 and
has been used in times of war and domestic disturbances. Orga-
nizationally, Territorial Army personnel are raised from among
employees of government agencies and public-sector enter-
prises and are formed into departmental units. Nondepart-
mental units are raised from other citizens, including former
active-duty military personnel. In the early 1990s, Territorial
Army units saw service in Jammu and Kashmir and along the
northern and western borders of India and in support of para-
military units subordinate to the Ministry of Home Affairs.
The National Cadet Corps, which is open to young men and
women, was established in 1948 to develop discipline and lead-
ership qualities useful in life and particularly for potential ser-
vice in the armed forces. The semiautonomous organization
receives guidance from the ministries of education and
defence at the central level and from state-level governments at
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the local level. It is organized into army, navy, and air force
wings, and its ranks correspond to those in the respective
armed forces.
Civil Defence Volunteers are under the leadership of a small
paid cadre, who are trained to provide early warning communi-
cations at the town level. They also participate in civil works
construction projects and natural disaster relief work. Subordi-
nation is through the local state or territory government and
the Ministry of Home Affairs.
The Home Guards are a voluntary force raised by state and
territory governments under the guidance of the Ministry of
Home Affairs. Home Guards undergo minimal training and
receive pay only when called for duty. They assist the police in
crime prevention and detection; undertake watch and patrol
duties; and aid in disaster relief, crowd control, and the super-
vision of elections. The central government reimburses the
states and territories at varying rates for expenses incurred in
the performance of Home Guard duties.
Space and Nuclear Programs
India detonated its first and only nuclear device at Pokharan
in the Rajasthan Desert in May 1974. Subsequently and in all
likelihood as a consequence of international pressure, India
has chosen not to conduct any further tests. At a formal level,
Indian officials and strategists deny that India possesses nuclear
weapons and refer to India's position as an "options strategy,"
which essentially means maintaining the nuclear weapons
option and exercising it should regional and international con-
ditions so warrant. In pursuit of this end, India refuses to sign
the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Formally, Indian officials argue that India's refusal to sign the
treaty stems from its fundamentally discriminatory character;
the treaty places restrictions on the nonnuclear weapons states
but does little to curb the modernization and expansion of the
nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapons states.
The Indian ballistic missile program has some elements in
common with the nuclear program. Under the aegis of the
Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme, India is
developing rockets of varying ranges: the Agni, the Prithvi, the
Akash, the Trishul, and the Nag. The Agni, which former
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi referred to as a "technology dem-
onstrator," was first test fired in May 1989 and again in May
1992. In 1995 it was not yet operational, but it has interconti-
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nental ballistic missile potential. The Prithvi—which some
sources reported had an operational unit raised in 1995 and
deployed along the Pakistani border—is a tactical, short-range
surface-to-surface missile designed by the DRDO as part of
India's antimissile defense system. Based on the Soviet Scud
missile, its 250-kilogram payload can be launched from a
mobile launcher. The Trishul is a sea-skimming short-range
missile. The Akash is a multitarget surface-to-air missile that
was being test fired in 1994 and 1995. The Nag is essentially an
antitank missile.
The Indian missile program has been of concern to the
United States, which, under the terms of the Missile Technol-
ogy Control Regime, imposed sanctions against the Indian
Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in June 1992. In July
1993, the United States prevailed upon the Russian space
agency, Glavkosmos, not to transfer cryogenic rocket engines
to India (see Russia; United States, ch. 9). The ISRO decided it
would develop the engine on its own by 1997 while continuing
to seek purchase of modified versions of the engines from Rus-
sia. Seven such cryogenic engines were scheduled for delivery
by Glavkosmos between 1996 and 1999. In keeping with its
agreement with the United States, Glavkosmos was not going to
transfer additional technology for cryogenic engines. However,
cryogenic engine technology transfer had begun in 1991, and
hence leading ISRO officials were confident about their 1997
projection.
Intelligence Services
The first post-independence military intelligence service was
the Intelligence Bureau established in 1947 under the aegis of
the Ministry of Home Affairs. Until 1962 the Intelligence
Bureau had wide-ranging responsibilities for the collection,
collation, and assessment of both domestic and foreign intelli-
gence. The failure of the Intelligence Bureau to assess ade-
quately the nature of the Chinese threat, however, led to a
reevaluation of its role and functions in the early 1960s. Mili-
tary Intelligence, which in the words of one retired Indian gen-
eral was "little more than a post office," was reactivated and
given the task of reporting to the revamped Joint Intelligence
Committee. The Joint Intelligence Committee is the key body
coordinating and assessing intelligence brought to it by the
Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence, and the Research
and Analysis Wing of the Office of the Prime Minister. Estab-
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lished in 1968, the Research and Analysis Wing is primarily
responsible for gathering external intelligence. Despite a sub-
stantial budget and extensive foreign postings, the wing's
efforts to gather intelligence even in South Asia are inadequate
according to some foreign analysts (see Role of the Prime Min-
ister, ch. 9).
Each of the armed services has a directorate charged with
the collection and dissemination of intelligence. Critics have
charged that there is inadequate cooperation and coordina-
tion among the service intelligence directorates, the Intelli-
gence Bureau, and the Research and Analysis Wing. There is,
however, an interservice Joint Cipher Bureau, which is in
charge of cryptology and signals intelligence. The Research
and Analysis Wing includes officers from the armed services
and also has a chief military intelligence adviser.
Military Justice
The Manual of Military Law and Regulations spells out rules
and procedures for the investigation, prosecution, and punish-
ment of military offenses and crimes in the armed forces. Basic
authority rests in the constitution, the Army Act of 1954, the
Air Force Act of 1950, and the Navy Act of 1957.
The army and air force have three kinds of courts. They are,
in descending order of power, the General Court, which con-
ducts general courts-martial; the District Court; and the Sum-
mary General Court. Additionally, the army has a fourth kind
of court, the Summary Court. Local commanding officers con-
duct this court with powers similar to nonjudicial punishment
in the United States armed forces. The navy uses general
courts-martial in addition to the nonjudicial powers established
for commanders in the Navy Act.
Courts-martial can be convened by the prime minister, min-
ister of defence, chief of staff of the service concerned, or
other officers so designated by the ministry or the chief of staff.
There are channels of appeal and stages of judicial review,
although procedures differ among the three services.
Members of the armed forces remain subject concurrently
to both civilian and military law, and criminal courts with
appropriate jurisdictions assume priority over military courts in
specific cases. With the approval of the government, a person
convicted or acquitted by a court-martial can undergo retrial
by a criminal court for the same offense and on the same evi-
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dence. Once tried by a civilian court, however, one cannot be
tried by a military court for the same offense.
Each of the three services has its own judge advocate gen-
eral's department, relatively free and independent of the other
branches in the discharge of its judicial functions. The various
departments have officers among the adjutant general's staff at
army headquarters, in the chief of personnel's staff at navy
headquarters, and in the administration staff of the air force
headquarters.
Public Order and Internal Security
Military Role Expansion
The army has four major roles or functions in the mainte-
nance of public order and internal security. One is to defend
India's territorial integrity and to maintain the inviolability of
its borders. Another involves dealing with internal security
threats stemming from secessionist demands and externally
supported insurgencies. The army also is called upon to assist
Chilian authorities in maintaining civil order when local police
forces and the paramilitary prove inadequate to the task.
Finally, the army can also be mobilized to deal with natural
disasters such as earthquakes and floods, the only domestic
function that the army performs with enthusiasm.
Despite the existence of numerous paramilitary forces, the
army has had to quell outbreaks of civil violence, primarily in
the states of Assam,Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab (see Para-
military Forces and Reserve Forces, this ch.). By the early
1990s, army involvement in Assam and Punjab had diminished
significantly as insurgencies waned. However, the role of the
army in Jammu and Kashmir expanded substantially as both
police and paramilitary forces failed to maintain law and order.
In 1993 upper-echelon army officers warned that excessive
use of the army to restore civil order might have a number of
corrosive effects. First, it might damage the morale of troops
who might be distressed at having to shoot civilians. Second, it
might have the effect of politicizing the army. The outgoing
chief of army staff, General Sunith Francis Rodrigues, publicly
articulated his misgivings on this subject. Furthermore, inJune
1993, Rodrigues presented a report entitled "Maximizing Effec-
tiveness of Central Police Organizations" to the Committee of
Secretaries (composed of a "core group", the secretaries of
defence, finance, and home affair, chaired by the cabinet secre-
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tary, and meeting on a weekly basis). The report called for the
army to take over the training of paramilitary forces.
Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and the Armed Forces
In response to a range of insurgencies since the early 1980s,
the central government has enacted an extensive array of legis-
lation that places substantial curbs on civil liberties. The
National Security Act of 1980, the National Security Amend-
ment Act of 1984, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Pre-
vention) Act of 1985 (which was renewed in 1987 and
suspended in 1995), and the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kash-
mir) Special Powers Act of 1990 are the most significant laws in
force. The ramifications of these four laws are sweeping. Under
their aegis, the central government has the right of preventive
detention, may seek in-camera trials, may send accused individ-
uals before designated courts, and may destroy property
belonging to suspected terrorists. Furthermore, under the
terms of the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Pow-
ers Act, members of the armed forces cannot be prosecuted for
actions committed in good faith in pursuance of the provisions
of this law.
During the 1980s and 1990s, both international and domes-
tic human rights groups asserted that human rights violations
are rampant. The principal international organizations making
these allegations are the International Commission ofJurists,
Amnesty International, and Asia Watch. Two Indian counter-
parts are the People's Union for Civil Liberties and the Peo-
ple's United Democratic Front. Indian and foreign press
reports have alleged that local police and paramilitary forces
have engaged in rape, torture, and beatings of suspects in
police custody. Numerous "militants" reportedly have simply
disappeared inJammu and Kashmir. On other occasions, espe-
cially in Punjab, security forces on various occasions allegedly
captured insurgents and then shot them in staged "encounters"
or "escapes." The government has either vigorously challenged
these allegations or asserted that condign punishment had
been meted out against offenders. The government has made
efforts to blunt the barrage of domestic and foreign criticism.
One such effort was the establishment of the five-member
National Human Rights Commission in 1993 composed of
senior retired judges. A report released by the commission in
November 1993 cited eighty Bombay police officials for "atroci-
ties, ill treatment, collusion, and connivance" and for "being
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openly on the side of the Hindu aggressors" during the Decem-
ber 1992 Hindu-Muslim riots. The commission's mandate does
not extend to violations inJammu and Kashmir and northeast
India, and it must rely on state investigative agencies for its
field work.
Insurgent Movements and External Subversion
Kashmir
In the mid-1990s, India was grappling with three separate
insurgencies of varying strengths in the states of Assam,Jammu
and Kashmir, and Punjab. The insurgency inJammu and Kash-
mir has the most serious implications for India. The long-term
roots of the Kashmir problem can be traced to the partition of
India (see National Integration, ch. 1). The crisis centers on a
militant secessionist demand that the Indian state has harshly
suppressed. Its proximate causes are located in the central gov-
ernment's attempts to manipulate state-level politics for short-
term political ends. Since 1989, approximately 10,000 civilians
have died at the hands of security forces or militants. Although
the origins of the crisis are quintessentially indigenous, there is
widespread agreement among both Indian and foreign observ-
ers that the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency of Pakistan has
actively aided and abetted some of the insurgent groups, most
notably, the radical Islamic Hezb-ul-Mujahideen.
The counterinsurgency strategy that the Indian government
has adopted inJammu and Kashmir was developed in the con-
text of dealing with guerrilla movements in India's northeast in
the late 1970s. This strategy involves denying the guerrillas any
sanctuaries, sealing the porous Indo-Pakistani border, and
using both army and paramilitary forces to conduct house-to-
house "cordon-and-search" operations. Whether this strategy
will lead eventually to the collapse of the insurgency inJammu
and Kashmir remains an open question; violence has contin-
ued to accelerate since 1993, with mounting casualties on both
sides and the destruction of an ancient mosque and shrine in
1995 (see Political Issues, ch. 8; South Asia, ch. 9).
Punjab
The insurgency in the state of Punjab originated in the late
1970s. The roots of this insurgency are complex. The Green
Revolution, a package of agricultural inputs, transformed the
socioeconomic landscape of Punjab (see The Green Revolu-
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tion, ch. 7). Amidst this new-found prosperity, large numbers
of Sikhs started to shed some of the trappings of their faith.
This propensity rekindled an age-old fear in the Sikh commu-
nity—that of being absorbed into the Hindu fold. In turn,
many Punjabi Sikhs, who were dispossessed of their land as a
consequence of agricultural transformation, found solace in
various revivalistic practices. One of the leaders of this revivalis-
tic movement was Sant Jar nail Singh Bhindranwale, a politi-
cally ambitious itinerant Sikh preacher. The second factor
contributing to the insurgency was the attempt by Indira Gan-
dhi (India's prime minister, 1966-77 and 1980-84), the Con-
gress, and from 1978 Congress (I) to use Bhindranwale to
undermine the position of the Akali Dal (Eternal Party), a
regional party (see Political Parties, ch. 8). Bhindranwale and
his followers were encouraged to verbally intimidate Akali Dal
politicians. Although this strategy met with some success, Bhin-
dranwale and his followers became a source of mayhem and
disruption in Punjab. Eventually, in June 1984, Gandhi had to
order units of the Indian army to flush out Bhindranwale and
his followers, who had taken refuge in the Golden Temple
complex, Sikhism's most holy shrine, in Amritsar, Punjab (see
Sikhism, ch. 3).
This exercise, Operation Bluestar, was, at best, a mixed suc-
cess. After all efforts at negotiation failed, Indira Gandhi
ordered the army to storm the temple. A variety of army units,
along with substantial numbers of paramilitary forces, sur-
rounded the temple complex on June 3, 1984. After the
demands to surrender peacefully were met with volleys of gun-
fire from within the confines of the temple, the army was given
the order to take the temple by force. Indian intelligence
authorities had underestimated the firepower possessed by the
militants, however, and the army brought in tanks and heavy
artillery to suppress the antitank and machine-gun fire. After a
twenty-four-hour firefight, the army successfully took control of
the temple. According to Indian government sources, eighty-
three army personnel were killed and 249 injured. Insurgent
casualties were 493 killed and eighty-six injured. Indian observ-
ers assert that the number of Sikh casualties was probably
higher.
The attack on the Golden Temple had the effect of inflam-
ing significant segments of the Sikh community. It is widely
believed that the two Sikh bodyguards who assassinated Indira
Gandhi on October 31, 1984, were driven by their anger over
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the Golden Temple episode. In the wake of Indira Gandhi's
assassination, mobs rampaged through the streets ofNew Delhi
and other parts of India over the next few days, killing several
thousand Sikhs. The New Delhi police proved to be partisan
observers and did little to stop or apprehend the rioters. Only
after the deployment of the army, almost three days after the
onset of the riots, was order fully restored.
The New Delhi riots had repercussions in Punjab as militants
stepped up their activities. Gandhi's son and political successor,
Rajiv Gandhi, sought unsuccessfully to bring peace to Punjab
with an accord signed with Harchand Singh Longowal, a mod-
erate Sikh leader. Rajiv Gandhi's successors, belonging to the
Janata factions, proved to be no more adept at resolving the cri-
sis. In fact, between 1987 and 1991, Punjab was placed under
President's Rule and governed directly from New Delhi (see
The Executive, ch. 8). Eventually, an election was held in the
state in February 1992. Voter turnout, however, was poor; only
about 24 percent of the population participated in the elec-
tions. Despite its narrow mandate, the newly elected Congress
(I) government gave a free hand to the police chief of the
state, K.P.S. Gill. His ruthless methods significantly weakened
the insurgent movement. Most political observers, however,
assert that long-term political stability in Punjab depends on
addressing the underlying grievances of segments of the Sikh
community.
Assam and the Northeast
The origins of the insurgency in Assam are quite different
from those in Kashmir and Punjab. The principal grievance of
the radical student movement, the United Liberation Front of
Assam, is nativist. Front members are violently opposed to the
presence of Bengalis from the neighboring state of West Ben-
gal and waves of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Various
rounds of negotiations between the United Liberation Front of
Assam and two successive central governments resulted in the
Assam Accord of August 15, 1985. Under the provisions of this
accord, persons who entered the state illegally betweenJanuary
1966 and March 1971 were allowed to remain but were disen-
franchised for ten years, while those who entered after 1971
faced expulsion. A November 1985 amendment to the Indian
citizenship law allows noncitizens who entered Assam between
1961 and 1971 to have all the rights of citizenship except the
right to vote for a period of ten years.
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In 1993 an accord was reached between the Bodo tribe and
the central and state governments. The accord established the
Bodoland Autonomous Council, which gave the Bodos limited
political and administrative autonomy. Nevertheless, violence
broke out in 1994: members of the Bodo Security Force, in the
wake of demands for a "liberated Bodoland" burned several vil-
lages and killed around 100 immigrant villagers. Both local
counterinsurgency forces and army units were sent in to
engage the Bodo militants.
A number of other insurgencies in the northeast have
required extensive use of army and paramilitary forces. Four
states in particular have witnessed various insurgent and guer-
rilla movements. The first and perhaps the most significant
insurgency originated in Nagaland in the early 1950s; it was
eventually quelled in the early 1980s through a mixture of
repression and cooptation. In 1993 Nagaland experienced
recrudescent violence as two ethnic groups, the Nagas and the
Kukis, engaged in brutal conflict with each other. Adding to
India's internal unrest in this region were the links established
between the Bodo insurgents in Assam and the National Social-
ist Council of Nagaland, which, in turn, had links to other
active insurgent groups and, reportedly, operatives in Thai-
land.
In neighboring Manipur, militants organized under the
aegis of the People's Liberation Army long fought to unite the
Meitei tribes of Burma and Manipur into an independent state.
This insurgent movement had been largely suppressed by the
mid-1990s.
In Mizoram the Mizo National Front fought a running battle
with the Indian security forces throughout the 1960s. As in
Nagaland, this insurgency was suppressed in the early 1980s
through a mixture of political concessions and harsh military
tactics.
In the state of Tripura, tribal peoples organized under the
leadership of the Tripura National Front were also responsible
for terrorist activity. This movement has, for the most part, also
been brought under control by the government.
The central government's success in quelling these insurgen-
cies was not without human and material costs. Although no
assessments of these costs exist in the public domain, it is
widely believed that the paramilitary forces and the army were
given a free hand in suppressing the uprisings. A prominent
Indian human rights activist and attorney, Nandita Haksar, has
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alleged that harsh methods were routinely used, including col-
lective punishment of villagers accused of harboring terrorists
in remote areas. Because of the continued level of insurgency
by Assamese and other groups, which had bases in neighboring
Burma, India and Burma started joint counterinsurgency oper-




The constitution assigns responsibility for maintaining law
and order to the states and territories, and almost all routine
policing—including apprehension of criminals—is carried out
by state-level police forces. The constitution also permits the
central government to participate in police operations and
organization by authorizing the maintenance of the Indian
Police Service. Police officers are recruited by the Union Pub-
lic Service Commission through a competitive nationwide
examination. On completion of a nationwide basic public-ser-
vice course, police officer candidates attend the National
Police Academy at Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. They are then
assigned to particular state or union territory forces, where
they usually remain for the rest of their careers. About 50 per-
cent of the officers are regularly assigned to states or territories
other than their own in an effort to promote national integra-
tion.
The constitution also authorizes the central government to
maintain whatever forces are necessary to safeguard national
security. Under the terms of the constitution, paramilitary
forces can be legally detailed to assist the states but only if so
requested by the state governments. In practice, the central
government has largely observed these limits. In isolated
instances, the central government has deployed its paramilitary
units to protect central government institutions over the pro-
test of a state government. During the Emergency of 1975-77,
the constitution was amended (effective February 1, 1976) to
permit the central government to dispatch and deploy its para-
military forces without regard to the wishes of the states (see
The Rise of Indira Gandhi, ch. 1). This action proved unpopu-
lar, and the use of the paramilitary forces was controversial.
After the Emergency was lifted, the constitution was amended
in December 1978 to make deployment of central government
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paramilitary forces once again dependent on the consent of
the state government. According to apologists for the central
government, this amendment prevented the government from
sending in paramilitary forces to protect the Babri Masjid
(Babri Mosque) in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, in December 1992
(see Public Worship, ch. 3).
The principal national-level organization concerned with
law enforcement is the Ministry of Home Affairs, which super-
vises a large number of government functions and agencies
operated and administered by the central government. The
ministry is concerned with all matters pertaining to the mainte-
nance of public peace and order, the staffing and administra-
tion of the public services, the delineation of internal
boundaries, and the administration of union territories.
In addition to managing the Indian Police Service, the Min-
istry of Home Affairs maintains several agencies and organiza-
tions dealing with police and security. Police in the union
territories are the responsibility of the Police Division, which
also runs the National Police Academy and the Institute of
Criminology and Forensic Science. The Central Bureau of
Investigation investigates crimes that might involve public offi-
cials or have ramifications for several states. The ministry also is
the parent organization of the Border Security Force.
State and Other Police Services
The Police Act of 1861 established the fundamental princi-
ples of organization for police forces in India, and, with minor
modifications, continues in effect. Consequently, although
state-level police forces are separate and may differ in terms of
the quality of equipment and resources, their patterns of orga-
nization and operation are markedly similar.
An inspector general, answerable to the home secretary of
the state, heads each state, union territory, or national capital
territory police force. Under the inspector general are a num-
ber of police "ranges" composed of three to six districts,
headed by deputy inspectors general. District police headquar-
ters are commanded by superintendents. District superinten-
dents have wide discretionary powers and are responsible for
overseeing subordinate police stations as well as specialty ele-
ments, such as criminal investigation detachments, equipment
storehouses and armories, and traffic police. Many large dis-
tricts also have several assistant district superintendents.
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Most preventive police work is carried out bv constables
assigned to police stations. Depending on the number of sta-
tions there, a district may be subdivided and., in some states,
further divided into police "circles" to facilitate the supervision
from district headquarters. Most of the major metropolitan
areas such as New Delhi. Bombay Calcutta, and Madras have
separate municipal forces headed bv commissioners. Police in
the states and union territories are assisted bv units of volun-
teer Home Guards, maintained under guidelines formulated
bv the Ministry of Home Affairs.
In most states and territories, police forces are functionally
divided into civil (unarmed) police and armed contingents.
The former staff police stations, conduct investigations, answer
routine complaints, perform traffic duties, and patrol the
streets. Thev usually carry lathis—bamboo staffs weighted or
tipped with iron.
Contingents of armed police are divided into two groups,
the district armed police and the Provincial .Armed Constabu-
lary The district armed police are organized along the lines of
an army infantry battalion. Thev are assigned to police stations
and perform guard and escort duties. Those states that main-
tain distinct armed contingents employ them as a reserve strike
force for emergencies. Such units are organized either as a
mobile armed force under direct state control or in the case of
district armed police (who are not as well equipped) as a force
directed bv district superintendents and generally used for riot-
control duty
The Provincial Armed Constabulary (Pradeshik) is an
armed reserve maintained at kev locations in some states and
active onlv on orders from the deputy inspector general and
higher-level authorities. Armed constabulary are not usually in
contact with the public until thev are assigned to VIP duty or
assigned to maintain order during fairs, festivals, athletic
events, elections, and natural disasters. Thev mav also be sent
to quell outbreaks of student or labor unrest., organized crime,
and communal riots: to maintain kev guard posts; and to par-
ticipate in antiterrorist operations. Depending on the type of
assignment, the Provincial .Armed Constabulary mav carry only
lathis.
At all levels, the senior police officers answer to the police
chain of command and respond to the general direction and
control of designated civilian officials. In the municipal force..
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the chain of command runs directly to the state home secretary
rather than to the district superintendent or district officials.
Working conditions and pay are poor, especially in the lower
echelons of the police forces. Recruits receive only around
Rsl,900 per month (about US$64). Opportunities for promo-
tion are limited because of the system of horizontal entry into
higher grades. Allegations of bribery, attributable to the low
pay and poor working conditions, have been widespread.
Since the late 1980s, women have entered in larger numbers
into the higher echelons of the Indian police, mostly through
the Indian Police Service system. Women police officers were
first used in 1972, and a number of women hold key positions
in various state police organizations. However, their absolute
numbers, regardless of rank, are small. Uniformed and under-
cover women police officers have been deployed in New Delhi
as the Anti-Eve Teasing Squad, which combats sexual harass-
ment against women ("Eves"). Several women-only police sta-
tions have also been established in Tamil Nadu to handle sex
crimes against women.
Police uniforms vary widely according to grade, region, and
kind of duty performed. Among the armed police, uniforms
tend to resemble army dress rather than conventional police
uniforms. The khaki uniforms of the Indian Police Service offi-
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cers are similar in all states, but headgear varies widely, espe-
cially among metropolitan areas.
The Criminal Justice System
The criminal justice system descends from the British model.
The judiciary and the bar are independent although efforts
have been made by some politicians to undermine the auton-
omy of the judiciary. From about the time of Indira Gandhi's
tenure as prime minister, the executive has treated judicial
authorities in an arbitrary fashion. Judges who handed down
decisions that challenged the regime in office have on occasion
been passed over for promotion, for example. Furthermore,
unpopular judges have been given less-than-desirable assign-
ments. Because the pay and perquisites of the judiciary have
not kept up with salaries and benefits in the private sector,
fewer able members of the legal profession have entered the
ranks of the senior judiciary.
Despite the decline in the caliber and probity of the judi-
ciary, established procedures for the protection of defendants,
except in the case of strife-torn areas, are routinely observed.
The penal philosophy embraces the ideals of preventing crime
and rehabilitating criminals.
Criminal Law and Procedure
Under the constitution, criminal jurisdiction belongs con-
currently to the central government and the states. The prevail-
ing law on crime prevention and punishment is embodied in
two principal statutes: the Indian Penal Code and the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1973. These laws take precedence over
any state legislation, and the states cannot alter or amend
them. Separate legislation enacted by both the states and the
central government also has established criminal liability for
acts such as smuggling, illegal use of arms and ammunition,
and corruption. All legislation, however, remains subordinate
to the constitution.
The Indian Penal Code came into force in 1862; as
amended, it continued in force in 1993. Based on British crimi-
nal law, the code defines basic crimes and punishments, applies
to resident foreigners and citizens alike, and recognizes
offenses committed abroad by Indian nationals.
The penal code classifies crimes under various categories:
crimes against the state, the armed forces, public order, the
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human body, and property; and crimes relating to elections,
religion, marriage, and health, safety, decency, and morals.
Crimes are cognizable or noncognizable, comparable to the
distinction between felonies and misdemeanors in legal use in
the United States. Six categories of punishment include fines,
forfeiture of property, simple imprisonment, rigorous impris-
onment with hard labor, life imprisonment, and death. An
individual can be imprisoned for failure to pay fines, and up to
three months' solitary confinement can occur during rare rig-
orous imprisonment sentences. Commutation is possible for
death and life sentences. Executions are by hanging and are
rare—there were only three in 1993 and two in 1994—and are
usually reserved for crimes such as political assassination and
multiple murders.
Courts of law try cases under procedures that resemble the
Anglo-American pattern. The machinery for prevention and
punishment through the criminal court system rests on the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973, which came into force on
April 1, 1974, replacing a code dating from 1898. The code
includes provisions to expedite the judicial process, increase
efficiency, prevent abuses, and provide legal relief to the poor.
The basic framework of the criminal justice system, however,
was left unchanged.
Constitutional guarantees protect the accused, as do various
provisions embodied in the 1973 code. Treatment of those
arrested under special security legislation can depart from
these norms, however. In addition, for all practical purposes,
the implementation of these norms varies widely based on the
class and social background of the accused. In most cases,
police officers have to secure a warrant from a magistrate
before instituting searches and seizing evidence. Individuals
taken into custody have to be advised of the charges brought
against them, have the right to seek counsel, and have to
appear before a magistrate within twenty-four hours of arrest.
The magistrate has the option to release the accused on bail.
During trial a defendant is protected against self-incrimination,
and only confessions given before a magistrate are legally valid.
Criminal cases usually take place in open trial, although in lim-
ited circumstances closed trials occur. Procedures exist for
appeal to higher courts.
India has an integrated and relatively independent court sys-
tem. At the apex is the Supreme Court, which has original,
appellate, and advisory jurisdiction (see The Judiciary, ch. 8).
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Below it are eighteen high courts that preside over the states
and union territories. The high courts have supervisory
authority over all subordinate courts within their jurisdictions.
In general, these include several district courts headed by dis-
trict magistrates, who in turn have several subordinate magis-
trates under their supervision. The Code of Criminal
Procedure established three sets of magistrates for the subordi-
nate criminal courts. The first consists of executive magistrates,
whose duties include issuing warrants, advising the police, and
determining proper procedures to deal with public violence.
The second consists ofjudicial magistrates, who are essentially
trial judges. Petty criminal cases are sometimes settled in pan-
chayat (see Glossary) courts.
The Penal System
The constitution assigns the custody and correction of crimi-
nals to the states and territories. Day-to-day administration of
prisoners rests on principles incorporated in the Prisons Act of
1894, the Prisoners Act of 1900, and the Transfer of Prisoners
Act of 1950. An inspector general of prisons administers prison
affairs in each state and territory.
By the prevailing standards of society, prison conditions are
often adequate. Some prison administrators concede that the
prevailing conditions of poverty in Indian society contribute to
recidivism because a prison sentence guarantees minimal levels
of food, clothing, and shelter. Despite this overall view, India's
prisons are seriously overcrowded, prisoners are given better or
worse treatment according to the nature of their crime and
class status, sanitary conditions are poor, and punishments for
misbehavior while incarcerated have been known to be particu-
larly onerous.
Prison conditions vary from state to state. The more prosper-
ous states have better facilities and attempt rehabilitation pro-
grams; the poorer ones can afford only the most bare and
primitive accommodations. Women prisoners are mostly incar-
cerated in segregated areas of men's prisons. Conditions for
holding prisoners also vary according to classification. India
retains a system set up during the colonial period that man-
dates different treatment for different categories of prisoners.
Under this system, foreigners, individuals held for political rea-
sons, and prisoners of high caste and class are segregated from
lower-class prisoners and given better treatment. This treat-
ment includes larger or less-crowded cells, access to books and
618
Public security awareness sign in New Delhi
Courtesy Robert L. Worden
newspapers, and more and better food. Despite laws that man-
date egalitarian treatment of Dalits (see Glossary), members of
Scheduled Tribes (see Glossary), and members of the so-called
Backward Glasses (see Glossary), a rigid class system that cir-
cumvents the spirit of these laws exists within the prison system
(see Varna, Caste and Other Divisions, ch. 5).
The press and human rights groups periodically raise the
subject of prison conditions, including problems of overcrowd-
ing, the plight of prisoners detained for long periods while
awaiting trial, and the proper treatment ofwomen andjuvenile
prisoners (children are often incarcerated with their parents)
.
Reports have also surfaced alleging that torture, beatings, rape,
sexual abuse, and unexplained suicides occur on many occa-
sions in police stations and prisons. Because of a shortage of
mental institutions, numerous "non-criminal lunatics" are
imprisoned, often under conditions worse than those afforded
criminals. The government concedes that problems exist, but
insists that its attempts at prison reform have suffered from a
paucity of resources.
National Security Challenges
As the twenty-first century approaches, India faces a number
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of key challenges to its national security. The vast majority of
emergent threats are essentially from within.
Because of increased educational opportunities, greater
political awareness, and media exposure, hitherto quiescent
ethnic minorities are steadily claiming their rights in the politi-
cal arena. This form of political assertiveness has generated a
backlash from the well-entrenched segments of India's majority
population. Much violence has accompanied this process of
social change. Increased use of coercion alone, however, is
unlikely to contain ethnoreligious violence. Further develop-
ment of India's political institutions and social policies is also
needed.
A related national security problem in the region is linked to
the porous borders and cross-national ethnic ties that charac-
terize South Asia. Consequently, Pakistan has found it expedi-
ent to support Muslim militants inJammu and Kashmir and, to
a lesser degree, Sikh insurgents in Punjab. India, on occasion,
has retaliated in Pakistan's Sindh Province, supporting various
movements for Sindhi autonomy. Furthermore, India has also
been involved in supporting the Tamil extremists in Sri Lanka.
As long as governments in the region yield to these tempta-
tions for short-term gains, continued fratricidal violence is
inevitable.
The other major source of instability in the region stems
from the proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile capabili-
ties in both India and Pakistan. The long-standing border dis-
pute with China and the memories of the 1962 military debacle
have encouraged India's efforts to acquire these capabilities.
India's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction may well
precipitate a three-way arms race in the region involving India,
Pakistan, and China. Such an arms race not only would be stra-
tegically destabilizing but also would impose enormous costs
on resource-poor societies.
* * *
Stephen Philip Cohen's The Indian Army is the best work on
the historical evolution of the Indian army. One of the earliest
and still useful accounts of India's security problems is Lome J.
Kavic's India's Questfor Security. Raju G.C. Thomas's Indian Secu-
rity Policy is probably the most comprehensive, although not
necessarily the most analytic, treatment of Indian security ques-
tions. Basic armed forces information appears in SP's Military
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Yearbook and the weekly armed forces news magazine Sainik
Samachar (available in thirteen languages), both published in
New Delhi. Analyses of the state of India's armed forces, includ-
ing its paramilitary forces, periodically appear in the journal
Armed Forces and Society. Within India the best discussions of
security issues are found in the privately produced Indian
Defence Review and the Institute ofDefence Studies and Analyses
Journal, the house journal of the government-supported think
tank, the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses. Broader
discussions of regional security issues can be found in Survival,
published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in
London.
The various wars that have taken place in the region are well
documented. The best analyses are Lionel Protip Sen's Slender
Was the Thread on the 1947-48 conflict, D.K. Palit's War in the
High Himalaya and Stephen Hoffmann's India and The China
Crisis on the 1962 India-China border war, Russell Brines's The
Indo-Pakistani Conflict on the 1965 war, and Robert Jackson's
South Asian Crisis and Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose's War and
Secession on the 1971 Indo-Pakistani conflict. Sumit Ganguly's
The Origins of War in South Asia is the only comparative and
comprehensive account of the three Indo-Pakistani conflicts.
Civil-military relations and defense decision-making issues have
been discussed in articles written jointly byjerrold F. Elkin and
W. Andrew Ritezel and by Sumit Ganguly.
An excellent discussion of nuclear proliferation issues is
found in Stephen Philip Cohen's Nuclear Proliferation in South
Asia. Indian nuclear and ballistic missile programs are dis-
cussed in some detail in Brahma Chellaney's Nuclear Prolifera-
tion: The U.S. -Indian Conflict. For an early analysis of the
motivations underlying the Indian nuclear program, see Sumit
Ganguly's "Why India Joined the Nuclear Club." Another use-
ful analysis of India's nuclear and ballistic missile programs is
Raju G.C. Thomas's "India's Nuclear and Space Programs:
Defense or Development?" An important discussion of Indian
strategic culture and doctrine is George K. Tanham's "Indian
Strategic Culture." (For further information and complete cita-
tions, see Bibliography.)
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